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Who Bears the Burden?  
The Place for Participation of Municipal  
Residents in Chapter 9 
 
C. SCOTT PRYOR* 
ABSTRACT 
Confirmation of a municipal Chapter 9 plan of adjustment should take the 
views of municipal residents into account on the issue of a plan’s 
feasibility.  State constitutional and statutory resources must be consulted 
to determine the baseline of services that must be addressed to evaluate a 
plan’s feasibility.  Although courts have not addressed the issue of 
residents’ standing, the question should be answered in the affirmative.  
The confirmation requirement of feasibility provides the substantive basis 
for standing, while the relaxed requirements for an Article I tribunal 
provide the constitutional justification for the standing of residents.  The 
diffuse and nonpecuniary nature of the interests of residents in municipal 
services warrants the appointment of an official committee on their behalf. 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent high-profile Chapter 9 bankruptcies like Detroit’s and 
Stockton’s have featured contested hearings on confirmation.1  The 
confirmation hearings for these cities have been highlighted by battles 
among groups of creditors, particularly ones between retirees (or their 
proxy) with their pension claims, and bondholders with their unsecured 
 
 * Professor of Law, Regent University School of Law.  J.D. 1980, University of 
Wisconsin Law School.  M.A. 1997, Reformed Theological Seminary.  I wish to thank 
Craig Stern, David Wagner, and Tessa Dysart for their valuable insights and suggestions, 
and the Campbell Law Review for sponsoring its symposium on municipal bankruptcy.  I 
also wish to thank William Magee and Kylen Kafer for their research and editorial 
assistance.  The final expression is, of course, mine alone. 
 1. See Michael Bathon et al., Stockton’s Pension-Protecting Bankruptcy Plan 
Approved, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 30, 2014, 5:51 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-
10-30/stockton-california-wins-court-approval-of-bankruptcy.html; Lisa Lambert, Detroit 
Trial Ends, Judge to Rule Nov. 7 on Bankruptcy Plan, REUTERS (Oct. 27, 2014, 7:39 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/27/us-usa-detroit-bankruptcy-idUSKBN0IG22Q20 
141027. 
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debt.2  The confirmation standards of creditors’ best interests, fair and 
equitable treatment of creditors, and no unfair discrimination among 
creditors have figured prominently.3 
An additional across-the-board criterion exists for confirmation of a 
Chapter 9 plan: the plan must be feasible.4  Unlike the comparable 
provision in Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,5 Chapter 9 does not 
define feasibility.  This Article demonstrates that feasibility should be 
considered from two perspectives: revenue feasibility and service 
feasibility.  Revenue feasibility looks to a municipality’s projected 
income—i.e., will there be enough tax and other revenues to make the 
plan’s promised payments?  This aspect of feasibility warrants participation 
by taxpayers in the confirmation process.6  Taxpayers are well situated to 
provide information on a city’s managerial slack and on the extent to which 
projected tax revenue is likely to be collected.7  The narrow focus of 
revenue feasibility also warrants formation of a committee of taxpayers 
whose expenses will be borne by the debtor city.8  The pecuniary stake of 
taxpayers in the implementation of most Chapter 9 plans affords them 
standing under Article III of the Constitution.9 
 
 2. See Steven Church, Calpers No Better Than Bondholders in Stockton Bankruptcy, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-
01/calpers-denied-special-protection-in-stockton-bankruptcy.html. 
 3. See generally C. Scott Pryor, Municipal Bankruptcy: When Doing Less is Doing 
Best, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 85 (2014) [hereinafter Pryor, Municipal Bankruptcy] (analyzing 
potentially irreconcilable requirements of fair and equitable treatment, no unfair 
discrimination, and best interests for cramdown of a Chapter 9 plan of adjustment). 
 4. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2012) (“The court shall confirm the plan if . . . the plan is in 
the best interests of creditors and is feasible.”). 
 5. Id. § 1129(a)(11) (“The court shall confirm a plan only if . . . [c]onfirmation of the 
plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial 
reorganization, of the debtor . . . .”). 
 6. See generally C. Scott Pryor, Who Pays the Price?  The Necessity of Taxpayer 
Participation in Chapter 9, 24 WIDENER L.J. 81, 98–109 (2015) [hereinafter Pryor, Who 
Pays the Price?] (demonstrating the need for taxpayer standing on the issue of feasibility). 
 7. Id. at 96–97. 
 8. See id. at 109–10 (“A committee of taxpayers, however, whose fees and expenses 
will be borne by the estate, will be able to rebut a one-sided feasibility analysis presented by 
a municipality and supporting creditors.”). 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Pryor, Who Pays the Price?, supra note 6, at 
102–04.  Pryor explains: 
Where a Chapter 9 plan proposes to increase taxes, taxpayers clearly have the 
requisite imminent concrete injury that can be redressed by the bankruptcy court.  
Even in cases where the plan does not propose a tax increase, the collective nature 
of the proceeding combined with the forward-looking standard of feasibility 
points to recognition of taxpayers as parties in interest. 
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Service feasibility asks whether the services provided by the city 
following confirmation of its plan will be adequate for its residents.  
Adjudication of service feasibility is more challenging than any other 
criterion for confirmation.  The baseline of services that residents are 
entitled to expect is uncertain, and the extent of services that will be 
provided following confirmation for years into the future is unclear.  While 
states regularly provide their cities with a variety of powers, they do not 
provide a comparable list of municipal duties.  Nor does the Bankruptcy 
Code.  In addition, the extent of municipal services following confirmation 
depends on a variety of factors that cannot be known at the time of 
confirmation.  This raises several questions: Will the municipal 
government have the skill and long-term political will to implement the 
plan in the face of economic and democratic challenges?  Will the needs of 
municipal residents stay the same?  Will municipal revenue remain 
adequate for those needs?10 
City residents should be heard on service feasibility.  Residents are 
parties in interest on this issue, even though they may not be able to point 
to an impending pecuniary loss.  They are nonetheless among the 
stakeholders who will bear the burden of a city’s insolvency.  The standing 
of municipal residents finds warrant in the notion that the bankruptcy 
discharge is a public right.11  Moreover, the significance of service 
feasibility, its inexact baseline, its future uncertainty, and the diffuse nature 
of city residents make it appropriate to appoint an official committee on 
their behalf.12  The limitations within Chapter 9 with respect to interference 
with municipal governance limit the issue on which a residents’ committee 
has standing to service feasibility alone.  Within that limit, however, the 
debtor municipality should bear the expenses of its committee of residents. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I identifies the resources by 
which to identify the baseline of services that a city must provide.  Without 
such a baseline, feasibility is a moving and uncertain target.  Part II 
addresses a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to consider the nonpecuniary 
interests of residents.  The interests of municipal residents may not satisfy 
the Article III case-or-controversy requirement.13  Confirmation of a 
Chapter 9 plan, however, is a public right.14  As an Article I tribunal, a 
bankruptcy court may legitimately consider the concerns of a wide range of 
 
Id. at 104 (footnotes omitted). 
 10. See infra notes 34–74 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 80–127 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 128–32 and accompanying text. 
 13. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also infra notes 119–27 and accompanying 
text. 
 14. See infra notes 91–118 and accompanying text. 
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parties in interest whose Article III standing might be questioned, including 
municipal residents.  Finally, Part III of this Article turns to the form and 
extent of participation by residents.  Residents should be represented by an 
official committee whose expenses are paid by the municipality.  
Consistent with the limits on the authority of bankruptcy courts,15 however, 
the scope of the committee’s input must be limited to feasibility and not 
extend to interference in the political or governmental powers of the city. 
I. THE FEASIBILITY BASELINE 
A. The Limits of Chapter 9 
Chapter 9 explicitly limits the powers of a bankruptcy court in the 
administration of a municipal bankruptcy.  In deference to the Tenth 
Amendment, § 904 of the Bankruptcy Code16 provides that the court may 
not interfere with any political or governmental powers of a city in 
bankruptcy.17  Section 903, in turn, locates in the state the power to define 
the “political or governmental powers” of its municipalities.18  Thus, a 
municipal plan cannot be confirmed if it falls short of what a state 
prescribes for the baseline of services to residents.  Conversely, the 
bankruptcy court cannot substitute its judgment for state law when it comes 
to the extent of those services.  Thus, this Article first examines what 
services states generally prescribe for their municipal subdivisions, and 
then identifies heuristics by which the adequacy of those services can be 
evaluated. 
B. Drilling Down on Municipal Services 
The concept of service-delivery insolvency (or simply “service 
insolvency”) is of recent vintage in Chapter 9 analysis.  It first appeared in 
Judge Christopher Klein’s opinion on the eligibility for Chapter 9 relief of 
 
 15. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (“This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a State 
to control, by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the exercise of 
the political or governmental powers of such municipality . . . .”). 
 16. Id. § 904. 
 17. Id. § 904(1); see also Pryor, Who Pays the Price?, supra note 6, at 83 (“[S]ection 
904 of the Bankruptcy Code bars a bankruptcy judge from interfering with the ‘political or 
governmental powers’ of a municipality.” (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 904(1))).  Section 904 also 
prohibits a court from interfering with “the property or revenues of the debtor,” or “the 
debtor’s use or enjoyment of any income-producing property.”  11 U.S.C. §§ 904(2)–(3). 
 18. 11 U.S.C. § 903. 
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the City of Stockton.19  Section 109(c)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code makes 
insolvency a requirement of Chapter 9 relief.20  Even though the Code 
defines “insolvent” in purely financial terms,21 Judge Klein held that “the 
degree of inability to fund essential government services (service delivery 
insolvency) also inform[s] the trier of fact’s assessment of the relative 
degree and likely duration of cash insolvency.”22  He went on to conclude 
that Stockton was experiencing service insolvency.23 
Service insolvency was also one of the benchmarks on which Judge 
Steven Rhodes relied when he concluded that Detroit was eligible for 
Chapter 9 relief.24  Judge Rhodes tied the notion of service insolvency to 
the second of the alternative tests for municipal insolvency: whether a 
municipality “is unable to pay its debts as they become due.”25  He 
concluded that the test is prospective and requires consideration of whether 
a municipality “has sufficient resources to maintain services for the health, 
safety, and welfare of the community.”26  Examples of Detroit’s inability to 
fund such services included the presence of many nonworking streetlights, 
multiple abandoned and blighted structures, delayed police-response times, 
lack of maintenance of fire-department vehicles, closed municipal parks, 
and obsolete information-technology systems.27 
While these things are no doubt of enormous significance to a city’s 
residents, its failure to address such problems is not evidence of a city’s 
inability to pay debts as they become due.  Unperformed municipal 
services are not debts.  For bankruptcy purposes, a debt is a liability on a 
 
 19. See Stockton V, 493 B.R. 772, 781 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013) (defining “service 
delivery insolvency” as “a municipality’s inability to pay for all the costs of providing 
services at the level and quality required for the health, safety, and welfare of the 
community”).  For a fuller analysis of this opinion, see Pryor, Municipal Bankruptcy, supra 
note 3, at 96. 
 20. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3). 
 21. Id. § 101(32)(C) (“The term ‘insolvent’ means . . . with reference to a municipality, 
financial condition such that the municipality is[] (i) generally not paying its debts as they 
become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute; or (ii) unable to pay its 
debts as they become due.”). 
 22. Stockton V, 493 B.R. at 789. 
 23. Id. at 789–90 (pointing to evidence of a reduction in the number of police officers 
and an increase in crime). 
 24. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 263 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (“The evidence 
established that there are many, many services in the City which do not function properly as 
a result of the City’s financial state. . . . [T]he city was in a state of ‘service delivery 
insolvency’ as of July 18, 2013, and will continue to be for the foreseeable future.”). 
 25. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C)(ii)). 
 26. Id. at 262 (citing Stockton V, 493 B.R. at 789). 
 27. Id. at 213–15. 
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claim,28 and the failure to deliver municipal services is not a claim.29  In 
other words, a city’s failure to provide services will very rarely give a 
resident a legal or equitable remedy against the city or its officeholders.30  
Nothing short of a claim can function as a measure of insolvency. 
“Service insolvency” is a useful metaphor, but it is not a standard that 
should be used to evaluate a city’s eligibility for bankruptcy relief.  The 
definition of “insolvent” in the Bankruptcy Code is purely financial,31 and 
there is no need to add a nonstatutory element to the multiple factors that 
the Code requires for Chapter 9.32  Notwithstanding the irrelevance of 
service insolvency at the eligibility stage, it can prove crucial when it 
 
 28. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (“The term ‘debt’ means liability on a claim.”). 
 29. See id. § 101(5).  The statute provides that the term “claim” means: 
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, 
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, 
equitable, secured, or unsecured; or 
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives 
rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is 
reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 
undisputed, secured, or unsecured. 
Id. 
 30. See OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 842–44 (3d ed. 2009) 
(describing limited circumstances where a court may issue a writ of mandamus to compel 
performance of a municipal duty). 
 31. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C)(ii). 
 32. See id. § 109(c).  Section 109(c) provides that an entity may be a debtor under 
Chapter 9 “if and only if such entity”: 
(1) is a municipality; 
(2) is specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name, to be a 
debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a governmental officer or 
organization empowered by State law to authorize such entity to be a debtor under 
such chapter; 
(3) is insolvent; 
(4) desires to effect a plan to adjust such debts; and 
(5) (A) has obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in 
amount of the claims of each class that such entity intends to impair under a plan 
in a case under such chapter; 
 (B) has negotiated in good faith with creditors and has failed to obtain the 
agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the claims of each 
class that such entity intends to impair under a plan in a case under such chapter; 
 (C) is unable to negotiate with creditors because such negotiation is 
impracticable; or 
 (D) reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a transfer that is 
avoidable under section 547 of this title. 
Id. 
6
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comes to the time of confirmation of the plan.33  To keep the notions 
distinct, what has been labeled as “service insolvency” at the eligibility 
stage of a Chapter 9 case will be called “service feasibility” when applied 
at the time of confirmation. 
1. Political Resources for Defining Municipal Duties 
Unless municipalities have duties to residents within their 
jurisdictions, there are no services to which the concept of service 
feasibility can attach, even at the confirmation stage of a Chapter 9 plan.  
While the extent of municipal powers has been discussed extensively by 
the judiciary and the academy,34 there has been virtually no analysis of 
municipal duties.35  If the concept of service feasibility is a chimera, it 
provides no more than a trope for the desires of civic activists.  A concept 
of service feasibility untethered to state law would effectively empower the 
court to interfere with the governmental and political powers of a 
municipality.  Moreover, if service feasibility has no legal content, it would 
follow that it should not be part of the plan-confirmation analysis.  Political 
justification for the imposition of duties on American cities, and thus, 
service feasibility, must therefore be sought in the texts and practices of the 
American legal tradition. 
The American political system has historically eschewed providing a 
foundation for positive rights.  Beginning with the United States 
Constitution, there is little warrant for a federal constitutional baseline for 
municipal services.36  Contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence has 
found no constitutional basis for positive duties of states or their 
subdivisions to their individual citizens or residents.37  Even high levels of 
 
 33. See infra notes 119–27 and accompanying text. 
 34. See REYNOLDS, supra note 30, at 167–71 (collecting cases and discussing municipal 
powers in terms of the famous Dillon’s Rule). 
 35. Michelle Wilde Anderson is not alone in her conclusion that “it [is] surprising to 
report that neither Chapter 9 case law nor state law regulations or guidelines define legally 
adequate [municipal] service levels.”  Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 
123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1194 (2014). 
 36. See EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES 4 (2013) 
(“While many prominent political figures, including several U.S. presidents, have argued on 
behalf of positive rights, few (and arguably no) positive-rights claims have ever changed 
either the U.S. Constitution’s text or the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it.”). 
 37. See generally DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
191 (1989) (articulating the doctrine of positive state action in United States constitutional 
law and holding that a victim of child abuse did not have a cognizable claim because state 
and local government agencies were not required to protect the victim from private violence 
that was not brought about by the conduct of the state’s own personnel).  The result would 
be the same under the common law of most states by virtue of the public-duty doctrine.  See, 
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race-based discrimination in the provision of municipal services do not 
violate the constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.38  The 
reticence to constitutionalize municipal duties is not surprising, since the 
United States Constitution is generally void of entitlements.39  Without 
explicit entitlements, an alternative resource for constitutional affirmative 
rights would be their implication from the Constitution’s procedural and 
negative rights.  It seems clear, however, that the complex and highly 
politicized challenges of implying positive rights from negative ones and 
then policing municipal inaction makes the Constitution an inappropriate 
resource from which to derive rights to particular municipal services, and is 
equally unsuited as a baseline for service feasibility.40 
Federal legislation might seem to be a more fruitful resource for 
deriving duties of local government.41  Yet even here, where federal–local 
relations are intertwined,42 few federal statutes set standards for municipal 
services as such, apart from conditions attached to receipt of federal funds.  
Federal statutory and regulatory regimes—apart from spending programs—
are largely limited to enforcing national commercial or environmental 
standards or vindicating existing rights.43  Federal spending programs 
 
e.g., Leone v. City of Chi., 619 N.E.2d 119, 121 (Ill. 1993) (“The courts of this State have 
held as a matter of common law that municipalities are generally not liable for failure to 
supply police or fire protection . . . .” (citing Huey v. Town of Cicero, 243 N.E.2d 214, 216 
(Ill. 1968))). 
 38. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 68–70 (1980). 
 39. See Mila Versteeg, Unpopular Constitutionalism, 89 IND. L.J. 1133, 1148 (2014) 
(citing Frank I. Michelman, The Protective Function of the State in the United States and 
Europe, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM 156, 161–62 (Georg Nolte ed., 2005) 
(contrasting the state-action doctrine in the United States with notions of protective duties in 
Europe)). 
 40. See Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of 
Powers, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1200 n.17 (2014) (“Scholars and judges seem to 
understand the general difficulty of policing ubiquitous inaction, the complexity of 
identifying workable baselines, and the inevitability of resource constraints.”). 
 41. See Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an 
Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 960 (2007) (“[D]irect relations between the 
federal government and local governments . . . play a significant role in areas of 
contemporary policy as disparate as homeland security, law enforcement, disaster response, 
economic development, social services, immigration, and environmental protection . . . .”). 
 42. See Richard C. Schragger, Democracy and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860, 877 (2012) 
(“States and cities are not even remotely fiscally autonomous . . . . Intergovernmental 
transfers and direct federal outlays to state and local governments . . . are the norm in our 
federalism.”). 
 43. See Davidson, supra note 41, at 969 (“[F]ederal law—constitutional and statutory—
provides baseline standards of fairness and equality that bind local government actors.”). 
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channeled through local governments have an enormously varied reach.44  
Federal statutes do not, however, identify across-the-board levels of service 
entitlements, and they are typically implemented through a kaleidoscope of 
state and local legal regimes.45 
State constitutions prove a sturdier basis for municipal duties.  As 
Emily Zackin demonstrates, “[s]tate constitutions contain a plethora of 
positive-rights provisions that cover a wide range of topics.”46  Among the 
most frequently included is the right to a free public education.47  More 
unexpectedly, many state constitutions contain a variety of labor rights, 
such as “the right to an eight-hour day, a minimum wage, and protection 
from blacklisting practices and private armies.”48  Other labor-oriented 
positive state constitutional rights include laborer’s liens, weakening of 
employer defenses to liability for workplace injuries, and, of course, 
workers’-compensation systems.49  More recently, some state constitutions 
have been amended to encompass a duty to protect the environment.50 
State statutes regularly go beyond constitutional mandates to require 
local governments to implement building codes, sanitation systems, and 
other matters.51  After canvassing these resources, Michelle Anderson 
ultimately concludes that, notwithstanding insolvency, municipal residents, 
as a class, are generally “entitled to have a 911 emergency system that 
dispatches police officers and firefighters, along with solid waste pick up, 
wastewater treatment, and other basics.”52  Analyzing these core functions, 
she derives three principal purposes of municipalities, which, in turn, 
 
 44. Id. at 971–73 (listing as areas of “cooperative localism” fields including homeland 
security, criminal justice, immigration, education, employment, housing, economic 
development, telecommunications, transportation, and environmental protection). 
 45. See Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal 
Laws and the Applicability of Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 
146 (2009) (“Although federal constitutional law nominally serves as the nation’s 
connecting sinew, its application . . . hinges on state and local legal norms, which are highly 
variable and create a functionally irregular rights regime.”). 
 46. ZACKIN, supra note 36, at 11. 
 47. See id. at 67–105 (discussing the inclusion of education rights in state 
constitutions). 
 48. Id. at 108. 
 49. Id. at 110–19. 
 50. Id. at 147 (“During the 1960s and 1970s . . . state constitutions came to include 
broad rights to environmental health and protection.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Frank Swindell, Note, Municipal Liability for Negligent Inspections in 
Sinning v. Clark—A “Hollow” Victory for the Public Duty Doctrine, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 
241, 242 n.4 (1996) (describing a lack of local liability for failure to enforce state-mandated 
building codes). 
 52. Anderson, supra note 35, at 1195. 
9
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warrant services by which they can be implemented.53  Those purposes are: 
“(1) to provide or facilitate services; (2) to hold land and property in the 
public interest; and (3) to regulate for public health, safety, and welfare.”54  
Anderson then identifies sets of specific duties to effect these purposes.  
Thus, under the broad rubric of services, she finds a mandate to provide 
those services “most vital to the preservation of life (police, fire, sanitation, 
public health), liberty (police, courts, prosecutors), property (zoning, 
planning, taxing), and public enlightenment (schools, libraries).”55  
Provision of infrastructure and public spaces are duties that pertain to the 
second purpose of local government—to hold land and property in the 
public trust.56  The third purpose entails regulation by means of the 
traditional police powers.57  Whether residents enjoy additional state-
specific rights would involve close examination of the statutes of each 
state, a task beyond the scope of this Article. 
Some might recoil from having such a meager list of positive rights 
function as the baseline of feasibility in a municipal Chapter 9 case.  For 
some, the nature of modern urban life calls for more than the provision of 
such a minimal range of municipal services.  For example, municipal 
services such as museums and entertainment venues do not fit neatly into 
Anderson’s list of municipal duties.  Nevertheless, in addition to this brief 
canvass of state law, public-choice theory also supports a relatively narrow 
understanding of municipal duties, at least under the circumstance of 
municipal insolvency.58 
Charles Tiebout provided one of the first accounts of the appropriate 
scope of the obligations of municipal government from an economic 
perspective.  In short, Tiebout argued, municipal government exists to 
provide local public goods.59  What constitutes public goods is thus at the 
center of the baseline of municipal duties and the service aspect of 
feasibility in Chapter 9.  Tiebout succinctly defined a public good as “one 
which should be produced, but for which there is no feasible method of 
 
 53. Id. at 1158. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1159 (quoting ROBERT L. LINEBERRY, EQUALITY AND URBAN POLICY 10 
(1977)). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. at 1195 (“Without resting on either extra-legal natural rights or affirmative, 
positive rights articulated in constitutional text, Americans do seem to have legally 
defensible, affirmative rights to basic local services in the context of insolvency law.”). 
 59. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 
416, 417 (1956) (“The consumer is, in a sense, surrounded by a government whose 
objective it is to ascertain his wants for public goods and tax him accordingly.”). 
10
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charging the consumers.”60  In other words, public goods are goods 
(including services) for which there is demand but which will not be 
supplied due to market failure.  The potential for market failure in the 
context of municipal services comes primarily in the form of “free riders” 
who would receive the benefits of services without payment.61  The failure 
of the market to deliver goods for which providers cannot be assured of 
payment (or the power to exclude those who do not pay) justifies their 
provision by government supported by the power to tax.  Roads are an 
example of public goods.  Without a guarded toll gate at the end of every 
driveway, there is no way to charge users for the good of a municipal 
street.  Public-choice theory thus provides a justification for taxing all 
residents for creating and maintaining roads.  Defining public goods in 
terms of market failure might produce a feasibility baseline that is even 
smaller in scope than what can be derived from state law.  It is unlikely to 
be significantly larger.62  Thus, an assertion that feasibility includes a 
panoply of services in addition to the legal minimum bears a heavy burden 
of proof. 
Drawing on the bricolage of resources described above, bankruptcy 
courts can identify the baseline necessary to find a plan feasible from the 
perspective of municipal services.  Feasibility requires judicial evaluation 
of projected postconfirmation municipal expenditures for matters addressed 
in the state’s constitution and legislation.  For aspects of other commonly 
provided municipal services, the court should take care to find their warrant 
in the state’s legal tradition of public health, safety, and welfare—the 
historical implementation of the police powers.  If the court can find no 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Clayton P. Gillette, Equality and Variety in the Delivery of Municipal Services, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 946, 957 (1987) (reviewing CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, 
THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS (1986)) (explaining that a “‘free rider’ problem” exists 
when “those who make capital contributions towards these services cannot efficiently 
exclude noncontributors from receiving substantial benefits”).  In addition to the free-rider 
problem, Gillette provides two reasons for market failure: cases where early users would 
pay a disproportionate share of the initial cost of an improvement that provides a good 
whose subsequent marginal cost is low (e.g., public water works), and cases where the cost 
of enforcement of exclusion of free riders is disproportionately high.  Id. 
 62. Id. at 960.  Gillette explains: 
Street paving, street lighting, sewage treatment, garbage collection, as well as 
monopolies ranging from local transportation to electric utilities, do not fall 
within the domain of local government solely from tradition.  Rather, these 
became “traditional” local government functions because, left to the private 
market, they were susceptible to undersupply (for social goods) and oversupply 
(for social bads). 
Id. 
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warrant other than an accretion of services procured by effective rent 
seekers, no legal duty to continue their provision exists.  In other words, if 
there is no legal justification for a particular municipal service, the city 
should not continue to provide the service if it has sought bankruptcy 
protection.  Once the baseline of municipal services has been identified, 
additional resources must be consulted for standards by which to measure 
their adequacy. 
2. How Much Risk Must Be Borne? 
Evaluating the extent of the financial commitment for municipal 
duties is even more problematic than identifying them.  Standing alone, the 
duty to provide a particular municipal service does little to determine its 
adequacy, especially when a city is insolvent.  A duty to provide a 
particular service does not entail its fiscal extent.  In other words, how 
many dollars should a municipality’s plan project for satisfying residents’ 
entitlements for a plan to be feasible?63  Payment of less than the full 
amount of creditors’ claims justifies a concomitant sharing by municipal 
residents in the risk of insolvency.  Like claims of creditors to payment, 
municipal residents are exposed to a risk of reduction in services.  Yet it is 
possible that reductions in municipal services before bankruptcy have 
already exposed residents to more than their share of the risk of insolvency.  
In any event, by what standard can a court measure such an obligation to 
share in the risk of insolvency? 
Michelle Anderson offers a set of heuristics to identify “locally 
appropriate priorities and values.”64  Although Anderson may understand 
these heuristics to provide a source for the baseline of municipal duties, 
they function better as a tool by which to measure the adequacy of the 
provision of municipal services.  While a state’s legal tradition answers the 
question of what duties are owed, other resources tell us how much.  There 
is no rule of law by which to measure the precise allocation of limited 
municipal resources among the legal duties that remain to a city in Chapter 
9.  Heuristics65 are the only means by which to assess proposed spending 
 
 63. See In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 34 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999) 
(“[T]here is no purpose in confirming a Chapter 9 plan if the municipality will be unable to 
provide future governmental services. . . . [D]etermination of the feasibility of the plan 
covers both repayment of pre-petition debt and future services.”). 
 64. Anderson, supra note 35, at 1195–96 (“[H]ow can courts or receivers monetize 
what current residents need and what assets they are entitled to hold for their long-term 
fiscal health? . . . Instead of attempting to answer this question comprehensively, I offer a 
set of heuristics for judges, receivers, and citizens to use . . . .”). 
 65. A heuristic has been described as a conceptual tool characterized by “non-
algorithmic, efficient, error-based, purpose-oriented, problem-solving tasks.”  Jordi Cat, The 
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on municipal services.66  Even though their application may not result in a 
specific dollar amount, heuristics can frame the analysis and provide 
standards other than the court’s conscience by which to analyze service 
feasibility.67 
The resources identified by Professor Anderson begin with a basic 
efficiency concern: service provision cannot be reduced to the point that tax 
revenue decreases.68  For example, if less expenditures for law enforcement 
would entail more crime, and if more crime would cause more residents to 
flee, it follows that the tax revenues would decrease, causing a decrease in 
payments to creditors.  Service feasibility blocks implementation of such a 
downward spiral.  Expenditures to the extent necessary to enforce building 
codes and state-law warranties of habitability, as well as other matters 
related to public health and safety, such as streetlights, are certainly 
warranted.69  Provision for funding the legally identified baseline must be 
sufficient to ensure that the baseline is achieved.  Public expenditures to 
eliminate urban blight and bring the conditions of older neighborhoods to 
the standard of contemporary land-use laws may also be considered to 
evaluate the funding of municipal services.70  Similarly, comparison to the 
collective bargaining agreements of comparable cities and regional and 
statewide average expenditures by category of service will be useful for the 
 
Unity of Science, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2014 ed.), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/scientific-unity/. 
 66. Resources for Anderson’s heuristics include efficiency and economic perspectives; 
recognition of a warranty of habitability for neighborhoods; land use and subdivision laws; 
building codes; environmental regulation; collective bargaining agreements; regional and 
statewide average service levels; best practices in neighborhood stabilization; and 
educational adequacy debates.  See Anderson, supra note 35, at 1196–1205. 
 67. See id. at 1195–96 (“This inquiry presents an opportunity to put social contract 
theory into action—a chance to explore and define the terms on which society expects 
government to provide services and protection in exchange for individuals’ obedience to the 
state.”). 
 68. Id. at 1196 (“Up to a certain point, services are in both creditors’ and residents’ 
interests, because they can protect (or even increase) the property values used as the basis 
for property tax assessments . . . .”). 
 69. Id. at 1197–98. 
 70. Id. at 1200.  As Anderson explains, 
  For instance, if a city requires one streetlight per fifty feet of sidewalk in a 
new subdivision of single-family homes, that figure can provide a starting point 
for a [bankruptcy court] to define the street lighting budget in an existing 
neighborhood funded in the city’s bankruptcy plan.  In other words, how much 
money does the city need to get that number of streetlights operational again? 
Id. 
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spending side of feasibility.71  Use of such heuristics is necessary to avoid 
substituting the court’s predilections for those of the political process. 
Especially with the evaluation of the extent of funding for a city’s 
duties, the bankruptcy court risks running afoul of the limits on its powers.  
Section 90372 of the Bankruptcy Code reserves the power of state 
government to control a municipality’s governmental powers.  To the 
extent a state has not mandated a particular level of funding for municipal 
services—as most have not—a city’s plan is free to project funding for 
services as it chooses, but the extent of that funding remains relevant to the 
plan’s feasibility.  Excessive funding, even for baseline services, is not in 
the best interests of creditors.  Inadequate funding is not feasible.  
Confirmation of a plan at either extreme is not warranted. 
Section 904 of the Bankruptcy Code73 also presents an impediment to 
treating funding of municipal services as an element of feasibility.  The 
bankruptcy court cannot order a decrease or increase in spending on 
services within the legally required services.  The court can, however, 
refuse to confirm a plan which over- or under-funds those services.74  
Constitutional and congressional limits on a bankruptcy court’s powers 
conflict with the same court’s duty to evaluate a plan’s feasibility.  While 
the court must be careful not to intrude into matters left to the states, it 
cannot shirk its duty to evaluate a plan’s feasibility. 
C. The Limits of the Confirmation Process 
A principal foundation of a plan of adjustment is its projections of the 
future.  Distributions to creditors are generally fixed at the time of 
confirmation, but the sources of payment—whether from tax revenues or 
transfers from other levels of government—are only projections.  So, too, 
are the levels of future municipal services and their costs.  The unfolding of 
the infinite variety of eventual contingencies makes problematic even the 
best projection of future municipal expenditures. 
Notwithstanding the vagaries in the fortunes of a postconfirmation 
city, it remains the most important governmental locus in the lives of its 
 
 71. Id. at 1202–03.  For additional heuristics, see id. at 1204–05. 
 72. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012). 
 73. Id. § 904. 
 74. See, e.g., Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir. 
1940) (reversing confirmation of a Chapter 9 plan where the debtor failed to utilize 
substantial unencumbered assets for the benefit of the creditors); see also Pryor, Municipal 
Bankruptcy, supra note 3, at 125 (arguing that courts should hold out credible threats of 
dismissal to force creditor constituencies to compromise). 
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residents.75  The inability to project with certainty the adequacy of funding 
for baseline services should limit the bankruptcy court’s evaluation of their 
feasibility to the near term only.  Built-in increases, however, should be 
eschewed, because changes in funding should be addressed through the 
postconfirmation political process.  Indeed, a confirmation order binding 
future city governments to spending increases would cross the line set by 
§ 904 of the Bankruptcy Code.  The court may no more interfere with the 
governmental powers postconfirmation than during the pendency of the 
case.76  Plans that automatically implement increases in spending for 
municipal services should not be confirmed. The postconfirmation political 
process—not an order confirming a Chapter 9 plan—provides the 
appropriate means by which to increase spending. 
II. FEASIBILITY JURISDICTION 
Municipal residents have legitimate expectations of their city.77  
Municipal residents are stakeholders when it comes to provision of 
municipal services, even if those services are no more than the 
implementation of state-mandated entitlements.  Yet, because municipal 
residents are not creditors, they have no right to vote on a plan.  Taxpayers 
also are not municipal creditors, but they arguably have standing 
nonetheless.78  Taxpayers have a sufficiently concrete interest to object to a 
plan’s feasibility,79 but what of residents who may not pay any direct taxes 
to their municipality?  While they benefit directly and indirectly from 
municipal services, is that adequate for standing to be heard on a plan’s 
feasibility? 
A. Jurisdiction 
A bankruptcy court must have jurisdiction over a Chapter 9 plan if it 
is to enter a final order confirming it.  Article III, Section Two, of the 
Constitution provides for the exercise of the “Judicial Power” of the United 
States over “all Cases” arising under the laws of the United States.80  In 
turn, Section One limits those who may exercise such power to the 
 
 75. See Davidson, supra note 41, at 968 (“Local governments are intimately involved in 
questions that implicate such central concerns as where and how people live, public safety, 
work conditions, and education.”). 
 76. 11 U.S.C. § 904. 
 77. See supra notes 34–62 and accompanying text. 
 78. See Pryor, Who Pays the Price?, supra note 6, at 99–104. 
 79. Id. 
 80. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law 
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United States . . . .”). 
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Supreme Court and such inferior courts that Congress establishes, so long 
as their judges have lifetime tenure and salaries that cannot be reduced.81  
Bankruptcy judges do not have such protections,82 and thus, may not 
exercise the judicial power of the United States when it comes to 
adjudication of private rights.83 
On the other hand, non-Article III tribunals regularly adjudicate 
various matters with full constitutional warrant; “[t]he first Congress itself 
entrusted disputes regarding veterans’ benefits, customs duties, and matters 
before courts-martial to determination by those who were themselves not 
judges at all.”84  Less than a century later, the Supreme Court validated 
congressional authorization of adjudication of a “public right” by a non-
Article III judge.85  For some—occasionally, including the Supreme 
Court—such matters are exceptions to the tenure and salary requirements 
of Article III.86  For the more textually minded, they instead represent the 
over-the-boundary markers of the judicial power.87  In other words, those 
 
 81. Id. art. III, § 1.  The provision provides: 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and 
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.  The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their 
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their 
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their 
Continuance in Office. 
Id. 
 82. See 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2012) (“Each bankruptcy judge shall be appointed for a 
term of fourteen years . . . .”). 
 83. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011).  The court wrote: 
  Article III of the Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United 
States may be vested only in courts whose judges enjoy the protections set forth in 
that Article. . . . The Bankruptcy Court below lacked the constitutional authority 
to enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the 
process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim. 
Id. 
 84. Craig A. Stern, What’s a Constitution Among Friends?—Unbalancing Article III, 
146 U. PA. L. REV. 1043, 1045 (1998). 
 85. See Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284–
85 (1855) (holding that the longstanding recognition of the “public right” of the executive to 
seize property to collect sums from an absconding tax collector was an example of 
collecting revenue, not an adjudication of a private right to property between two parties). 
 86. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853–54 
(1986); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 582–86 (1985). 
 87. See Stern, supra note 84, at 1052 (“Article III purports to describe and vest only 
‘the judicial Power.’  Conducting courts-martial and deciding matters of public rights are 
matters of executive, not judicial, power.  Consequently, Article III and its Section 1 
security have nothing to do with them.” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1) (emphasis 
added)). 
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who adjudicate in courts-martial, administrative agencies, and with respect 
to matters arising as public rights are simply not exercising the judicial 
power of the United States encompassed in Section Two of Article III; 
thus, the requirements of Section One do not apply to them. 
Yet, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts is not like courts-martial, 
which have historically been associated with the executive power.88  
Neither is bankruptcy set apart from the jurisdiction of the United States, 
like territorial courts.89  Moreover, bankruptcy courts are not agencies in 
which the executive makes judicially reviewable decisions in the course of 
administering a federal program.90  Thus, a bankruptcy court can enter a 
final order confirming a Chapter 9 plan only if the Chapter 9 plan is a 
public right. 
Over the course of its evaluation of bankruptcy judges’ jurisdictional 
limits, a majority of the Supreme Court has been careful not to answer 
whether any part of bankruptcy adjudication is a public right.  For instance, 
in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,91 the 
Court held that a bankruptcy judge did not have the power to enter a 
judgment in an action for damages for breach of contract brought by a 
Chapter 11 debtor.92  According to the plurality opinion, a state-law 
contract action was clearly a private right.93  Thus, no person without 
 
 88. See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65, 79 (1857) (explaining that the Constitution vests 
Congress with the power to establish the military, along with its customary usages, 
including courts-martial); Stern, supra note 84, at 1055 (“[C]ourts-martial do not exercise 
the judicial power.  Instead, they exercise the executive power, the power of a military 
command to discipline its troops.”). 
 89. See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511, 545–46 (1828) (holding that territorial 
courts established by Congress pursuant to the Constitution could exercise admiralty 
jurisdiction because they had nothing to do with Article III); Stern, supra note 84, at 1067–
68 (“The courts that Congress establishes for such polities under its control are not truly 
United States courts.  They, like state courts, are courts of their respective polities.”). 
 90. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 49–50 (1932) (holding that a federal agency 
could award compensation against a private employer under a federal act because it 
functioned as a fact-finder subject to federal court review); see also Stern, supra note 84, at 
1073 (“As long as ‘judges’ with Section 1 security perform all ‘judging,’ Article III leaves 
Congress free to constitute courts with subalterns as it sees fit, possibly even filling courts 
with agents of the executive.”). 
 91. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
 92. Id. at 84 (“[T]he cases before us, which center upon appellant Northern’s claim for 
damages for breach of contract and misrepresentation, involve a right created by state 
law . . . .”). 
 93. Id. at 71–72 (plurality opinion) (“Appellant Northern’s right to recover contract 
damages to augment its estate is ‘one of private right, that is, of the liability of one 
individual to another under the law as defined.’” (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51)). 
17
Pryor: Who Bears the Burden? The Place for Participation of Municipal Re
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015
178 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:161 
Article III tenure could enter a final judgment.94  The Court took pains not 
to decide whether something as fundamental to the bankruptcy power95 as 
the discharge was a public right.96 
Seven years after Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court again 
addressed the public- versus private-right bankruptcy distinction in 
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg.97  In Granfinanciera, the Court held that 
even in an action created by the Bankruptcy Code, a defendant was entitled 
to a jury trial, at least when Congress had “simply reclassified a pre-
existing, common-law cause of action that was not integrally related to the 
reformation of debtor-creditor relations.”98  The Seventh Amendment right 
to a trial by jury,99 according to the Court, was congruent with the Article 
III requirement that only someone with lifetime tenure may enter a 
judgment in a matter of a private right.100  The majority opinion simply 
repeated the proposition from Northern Pipeline that “the restructuring of 
debtor-creditor relations” may be a public right.101 
Over twenty years passed before the Court’s next foray into the 
thicket of bankruptcy-court jurisdiction.  In Stern v. Marshall,102 the 
majority held that the bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction over a 
debtor’s state-law counterclaim for tortious interference with the 
expectation of a gift, even though the claim arose in response to a creditor’s 
claim for defamation.103  The fact that the defendant filed a proof of claim 
in the debtor’s bankruptcy did not entail a different result.104  The majority 
 
 94. Id. at 87. 
 95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have Power 
to . . . establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies . . . .”). 
 96. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 71 (“[T]he restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which 
is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished from the adjudication 
of state-created private rights . . . . The former may well be a ‘public right,’ but the latter 
obviously is not.”). 
 97. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
 98. Id. at 60. 
 99. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 100. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 53 (“[T]he question whether the Seventh Amendment 
permits Congress to assign its adjudication to a tribunal that does not employ juries as 
factfinders requires the same answer as the question whether Article III allows Congress to 
assign adjudication of that cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal.”). 
 101. Id. at 56. 
 102. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
 103. Id. at 2620 (“The Bankruptcy Court below lacked the constitutional authority to 
enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of 
ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim.”). 
 104. Id. at 2616.  The Court wrote: 
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went on to address the public- versus private-right question at length, 
without reaching a conclusion with respect to bankruptcy law.105  It seems 
likely that all members of the Court would agree that Congress could 
assign to a non-Article III tribunal virtually any claim against the federal 
government, the quintessential example of a public right.106  But 
confirmation of a Chapter 9 plan of adjustment does not involve a matter 
between an entity and the federal government.  May confirmation 
nonetheless be a public right? 
There can be no doubt that the four dissenters in Stern would classify 
confirmation of a plan as a public right.  If, as they concluded, a 
counterclaim by a debtor against a creditor should be a public right,107 
surely something as central to the process of reorganization as plan 
confirmation would be a public right.108  Excluding Justice Scalia, the four 
members in the Stern majority would probably agree.  While the majority 
expressly declined to decide whether any part of the bankruptcy system 
might be a public right,109 it described a two-step analysis by which to 
make the determination.  Adjudication by a judge with Article III tenure is 
required if two conditions are not met: (1) “[i]f a statutory right is not 
closely intertwined with a federal regulatory program Congress has power 
 
Pierce’s claim for defamation in no way affects the nature of Vickie’s 
counterclaim for tortious interference as one at common law that simply attempts 
to augment the bankruptcy estate—the very type of claim that we held in 
Northern Pipeline and Granfinanciera must be decided by an Article III court. 
Id. 
 105. Id. at 2611–15. 
 106. Id. at 2612 (defining public rights as including matters “arising ‘between the 
Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the 
constitutional functions of the executive or legislate departments’” (quoting Crowell v. 
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932))); id. at 2620 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A] matter of public 
rights . . . must at a minimum arise between the government and others.” (quoting 
Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 65 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) 
(internal quotation marks omitted))); id. at 2626 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that a 
public right requires application of five factors of “substance rather than doctrinaire reliance 
on formal categories” (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 578, 
587 (1985))). 
 107. Id. at 2626 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“A grant of authority to a bankruptcy court to 
adjudicate compulsory counterclaims does not violate any constitutional separation-of-
powers principle related to Article III.”). 
 108. See id. at 2626–29 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing and applying the five-factor test 
to determine propriety of congressional assignment of a matter to a non-Article III tribunal). 
 109. Id. at 2614 n.7 (eschewing to decide whether “the restructuring of debtor-creditor 
relations” is a public right because “neither party ask[ed] us to reconsider the public rights 
framework for bankruptcy”). 
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to enact”;110 and (2) “if that right neither belongs to nor exists against the 
Federal Government.”111  Reframing the first requirement in the positive, 
we see that confirmation of a plan is certainly intertwined with Chapter 9, 
which Congress enacted pursuant to its constitutional bankruptcy power.112  
In other words, plan confirmation “stems from the bankruptcy itself.”113  
The relief offered by Chapter 9—the discharge—was not available at 
common law114 and exists only “by the grace of the other branches.”115  
Confirmation discharges a municipality’s preconfirmation debts and 
substitutes the promises of the plan in their place.116  As the plurality 
acknowledged in Northern Pipeline, the discharge is “at the core of the 
federal bankruptcy power.”117  Thus, despite their continuing reticence, 
four members of the majority in Stern would likely join the four dissenters 
and hold that a non-Article III tribunal may enter a final order confirming a 
plan.118  Bankruptcy court jurisdiction over confirmation of a Chapter 9 
plan ensures that its order confirming the plan is final. 
 
 110. Id. at 2614 (quoting Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 54–55) (alteration in original). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2012); United 
States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51 (1938) (upholding the constitutionality of Chapter IX of 
the Bankruptcy Act). 
 113. Deitz v. Ford (In re Deitz), 469 B.R. 11, 17 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Stern, 
131 S. Ct. at 2618). 
 114. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 
3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 10 (1995) (describing legislative introduction of the 
discharge into the creditor remedy of bankruptcy in the Statute of Anne in 1705). 
 115. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614. 
 116. 11 U.S.C. § 944(b) (“Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the debtor 
is discharged from all debts as of the time when . . . the plan is confirmed . . . .”); see also 
Sanders v. Muhs (In re Muhs), Chap. 7 Case No. 09-10564, Adv. No. 10-1008, 2011 Bankr. 
LEXIS 3032, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2011) (“The Bankruptcy Code is a public 
scheme for restructuring debtor-creditor relations, necessarily including . . . ’the ultimate 
discharge that gives the debtor a “fresh start” . . . .’” (quoting Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 
546 U.S. 356, 364 (2006))). 
 117. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982) 
(plurality opinion). 
 118. Justice Scalia, whose understanding of public rights is the narrowest of any member 
of the Court, admits that a non-Article III tribunal might be permitted to adjudicate 
allowance of claims against the bankruptcy estate.  Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2621 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“Perhaps historical practice permits non-Article III judges to process claims 
against the bankruptcy estate.”).  Given the historical centrality of the discharge to 
bankruptcy, even Justice Scalia might agree that confirmation is a public right.  In any 
event, it seems likely that a majority would.  See also S. Todd Brown, Constitutional Gaps 
in Bankruptcy, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 179, 214 (2012).  Brown writes: 
  In sum, Marshall may be read to continue the Court’s effort to distinguish 
between rights that are (a) created by the legislative scheme to restructure debtor-
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B. Standing 
The Article III limits on standing—an allegation of an injury fairly 
traceable to a defendant’s conduct that the court may redress119—do not 
apply when a non-Article III tribunal adjudicates a public right.  Enacting 
uniform laws concerning bankruptcy is among the enumerated powers of 
Congress,120 and the discharge is at the center of that power.121  The 
constitutional warrant for a bankruptcy judge’s order confirming a plan 
with its concomitant discharge thus comes from congressional action 
pursuant to Article I of the Constitution; we find in Article II the duty of 
the President to “take [c]are that the Laws be faithfully executed.”122  
Congress’s Article I powers and the President’s Article II powers operate 
together as the constitutional fulcrum for the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 
judge that exists today.123  Even without the ability to exercise the judicial 
power of the United States, bankruptcy judges can implement the joint 
Article I and Article II powers of Congress and the Executive. 
By requiring that the plan be feasible, Congress has given all those 
within the broad “zone of interests” of a confirmed plan—whom the 
Bankruptcy Code characterizes as parties in interest—a stake in the process 
of confirmation.124  Although as a general rule, neither the Executive125 nor 
 
creditor relations; (b) necessarily incorporated as part of the substantive design of 
that scheme; and (c) private matters, regardless of whether they are relabeled 
under the Code.  For example, a debtor’s right to . . . a discharge . . . appear[s] to 
fall in the first category because [it is a] creation[] of bankruptcy law that [is] 
central to the restructuring scheme. 
Id. (citing In re Turner, 462 B.R. 214, 221 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011)). 
 119. See Pryor, Who Pays the Price?, supra note 6, at 99–104. 
 120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have Power 
to . . . establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies . . . .”). 
 121. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 192 (James Madison) (Jim Manis ed., 2014).  Madison 
wrote: 
The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected 
with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the 
parties or their property may lie or be removed into different States, that the 
expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question. 
Id. 
 122. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 123. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2612 (describing “the public rights exception” in terms of 
cases “arising ‘between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection 
with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative 
departments’” (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50–51 (1932))). 
 124. See S. Todd Brown, Non-Pecuniary Interests and the Injudicious Limits of 
Appellate Standing in Bankruptcy, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 569, 583 (2007).  Brown later writes 
on a different test: 
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Congress can delegate the duty to enforce the laws to private parties,126 an 
across-the-board nondelegation rule should not be applied when the law in 
question does not impinge on private liberty.127  An objection by municipal 
residents to the feasibility of a plan does not implicate the life, liberty, or 
property of any person.  Therefore, a broad notion of standing is 
appropriate on the issue of feasibility.  It is the duty of the Executive to 
provide an adjudicatory mechanism by which Congress’s bankruptcy 
power may be implemented, and hence to provide all parties in interest, 
including municipal residents, an opportunity to be heard.  Bankruptcy 
courts are such an adjudicatory mechanism. 
The breadth, and even the uncertainty of “party in interest” is 
precisely appropriate for the work of a non-Article III tribunal.  With 
respect to matters of public right, it is for Congress to decide the scope of 
the public that has a right to be heard and for the Executive to provide the 
opportunity.  Bankruptcy judges should therefore afford that right to a 
broad range of persons.  An expansive understanding of non-Article III 
standing is warranted.  When service feasibility is the issue, that expansive 
understanding certainly includes municipal residents. 
 
[T]his is not to say that the pecuniary interest test should be discarded in its 
entirety.  It may be much easier to understand the dynamic when a provision is 
clearly designed to protect a specific, narrow pecuniary interest and the pecuniary 
interest test can play an important role in discerning what interests fall within the 
zone of interests of that provision.  But it should be just that—one test designed to 
assist with the consideration of standing . . . . The problem lies with holding to the 
erroneous view that this narrow standard is relevant to any interests represented or 
issues that arise in a case or proceeding. 
Id. at 619. 
 125. See Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 J. 
CONST. L. 781, 821 (2009) (“[The Constitution] prohibits the government from delegating 
certain discretionary functions to nongovernmental actors.”). 
 126. Id. (“Various constitutional rules—ranging from the Article I nondelegation 
doctrine to the due process and establishment clause contexts—prohibit the 
government . . . from delegating broad discretionary power to private parties.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 127. Id. at 791 (“Under the Article II nondelegation principle, standing doctrine 
serves . . . to safeguard individual liberty against arbitrary exercises of private prosecutorial 
discretion.  The constitutional protection therefore applies only in cases that implicate 
private liberty . . . .”). 
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III.  RESIDENTS’ REPRESENTATION 
A. Residents’ Committees 
The interests of municipal residents are exceptionally diverse.  Issues 
concerning the range of legally required services multiplied by the needs of 
tens or hundreds of thousands of citizens, residents, and entities that have a 
physical and economic presence in a city make individualized 
representation impractical.  Recognition of a committee of residents is 
warranted by the incorporation of § 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code into 
Chapter 9.128  Only rarely will the value of the objections of a single 
resident on the basis of service feasibility match the cost of effective 
representation.129  Collective action is thus a necessary requirement for 
effective evaluation of service insolvency, but it is not sufficient. 
The very rationale proffered by public-choice theory for identifying 
municipal duties130 provides the warrant for municipal subsidy of the 
expenses of a residents’ committee.  In other words, the expenses of a 
residents’ committee are a public good.  Free riders cannot be excluded 
from the benefits of a committee’s efforts, and, without adequate funding, 
no adequate representation of municipal residents will take place.  The 
requirement of feasibility for confirmation of a plan reinforces the 
conclusion that these expenses are a public good.  Just as confirmation of a 
plan is a public right warranting participation by noncreditor residents,131 
so, too, are public means to vindicate that right.  Existing constituencies 
with the financial wherewithal to protect their interests—creditors—exist 
with respect to the other requirements for confirmation.132  The public 
interest of service feasibility, by contrast, requires public support. 
Detroit’s Chapter 9 proceedings have seen an example of such support 
with the appointment of a feasibility expert.133  While the court has the 
power to appoint an expert witness,134 appointment of a residents’ 
committee with the powers both to select an expert and to advocate its view 
 
 128. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating § 1102 by reference). 
 129. See Pryor, Who Pays the Price?, supra note 6, at 107 (describing a similar 
economic disincentive for taxpayers). 
 130. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. 
 131. See supra notes 85–127 and accompanying text. 
 132. See Pryor, Who Pays the Price?, supra note 6, at 114 (“Without the right to vote, an 
attack on a plan’s feasibility is the only recourse [residents] have.”). 
 133. In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2014) (order 
appointing expert witness). 
 134. See FED. R. EVID. 706(a). 
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of service feasibility is more consistent with an adversarial approach to 
adjudication. 
B. Keeping the “Political,” Political . . . But Not Too Political 
All aspects of service feasibility are deeply political.  Identification of 
the baseline of legally required municipal services, as well as the extent of 
their funding, are at the center of the political existence of municipalities.135  
Yet, for both constitutional and statutory reasons, the powers of the 
bankruptcy court are constrained when it comes to “political or 
governmental” powers of a municipality.136  The court can maintain the 
balance between these limitations and the requirement of feasibility by 
restricting the scope of the committee’s powers.  Limiting the standing of a 
residents’ committee to the issue of service feasibility “would reduce the 
risk of turning the Chapter 9 case into a political free-for-all.”137 
Even though the virtues of political liberalism should be respected, the 
“democratic deficit” in municipal elections138 further warrants appointment 
of a residents’ committee.  A committee that reflects the interests of voting 
and non-voting residents as they pertain to service feasibility is justified 
because Congress has made feasibility a requirement of confirmation and 
because “the personal interests of municipal office holders may not 
coincide with larger groups within the municipality.”139  A committee of 
residents chosen for the narrow purpose of evaluating service feasibility 
further ensures the legitimacy of the final result.  A vigorous assessment of 
a plan’s feasibility led by residents will reduce subsequent criticism of a 
plan and increase the likelihood that the plan’s implementation will be 
preserved by the subsequent democratic process.140 
 
 135. See supra notes 34–74 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text; see also Pryor, Who Pays the 
Price?, supra note 6, at 83. 
 137. See Pryor, Who Pays the Price?, supra note 6, at 106 (making the same point with 
respect to taxpayers). 
 138. See id. at 94.  Of local elections, Pryor writes: 
  Municipal elections enjoy less legitimacy than elections at other levels of state 
and federal governments.  Low voter turnout and the opacity of the issues of 
municipal governance . . . cause most municipal elections to turn on the ability of 
relatively small groups to organize a high-percentage turnout of like-minded 
voters. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 139. Id. 
 140. See supra notes 9–15 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
Every Chapter 9 plan must be feasible to be confirmed.  Feasibility 
includes provision of mandated municipal services.  As the recipients or 
beneficiaries of such services, municipal residents have standing to object 
to a municipal plan of adjustment on the ground that it is not feasible.  
First, while the substance of municipal duties are created by state law, the 
uncertainty of their boundaries entails a role for residents in identifying 
them.  Second, a plan’s provisions for funding those services are not 
susceptible to rule-based evaluation.  Thus, municipal residents are entitled 
to weigh in on the adequacy of services proposed for the postconfirmation 
city as much as the plan’s proponents. 
It remains the case that §§ 903 and 904 of the Bankruptcy Code limit 
the powers of the bankruptcy court when it comes to a municipality’s 
exercise of its governmental powers.  Such limits on federal power do not, 
however, eliminate the requirement that a municipality’s plan be feasible.  
Evaluating the services that the municipality plans to provide merely 
implements state-law identification of municipal duties; it is not an 
interference with the municipality’s political or governmental powers. 
The nonpecuniary nature of the interests of residents, even as indirect 
beneficiaries of municipal services, is not an impediment to their standing 
to contest a plan’s feasibility.  The constitutional limits on judicial standing 
are immaterial when it comes to plan confirmation.  Confirmation of a 
Chapter 9 plan—with the concomitant discharge of indebtedness—is a 
public right.  Thus, the constitutional bankruptcy power granted to the 
legislative branch increases the range of interests of those who may appear 
before a non-Article III tribunal.  In other words, Congress, not the 
Constitution, has the power to determine the scope of bankruptcy-related 
parties in interest. 
In addition, the diffuse interests of municipal residents will make 
appointment of a residents’ committee, whose expenses will be borne by 
the city, appropriate in many large municipal bankruptcies.  To the extent 
that federal courts conclude that municipal residents are not parties in 
interest, or that they are not entitled to an official committee, Congress 
should amend the Bankruptcy Code to make such conclusions clear.  The 
requirement that a Chapter 9 plan be feasible is appropriate.  Congress 
should ensure that the issue of feasibility receives the thorough vetting it 
deserves. 
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